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  The South African elections of 1994 marked a fundamental turning point in the country’s 
democratic transformation. As the ANC-led government of national unity took control, 
beleaguered apartheid institutions were dismantled and a new constitutional, legal, and policy 
environment emerged. The transformative agenda extended well beyond a new vision of basic 
human and political rights for all South Africans. There was also a pressing need to address the 
economic legacy of apartheid: staggering inequalities, widespread poverty, unequal access to 
social services and infrastructure, and an economy that had been in crisis for nearly two decades. 
Has economic policy in the democratic era been successful in reducing the social deficit left by 
the apartheid regime? This Policy Brief grapples with this question by analyzing some key socio-
economic trends in South Africa since the ’94 elections. 
 
  The key policy framework which has determined the trajectory of the post-apartheid 
economic transformation is the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy that the 
Department of Finance (now the National Treasury) introduced in June 1996. The GEAR 
policies were launched in an environment in which the rand was depreciating and foreign 
exchange reserves were at an extremely low level. The strategy proposed a set of medium-term 
policies aimed at the rapid liberalization of the South African economy. These policies included 
a relaxation of exchange controls, trade liberalization, “regulated” flexibility in labor markets, 
strict deficit reduction targets, and monetary policies aimed at stabilizing the rand through 
market interest rates. Another component of the strategy – the privatization of state assets – was 
being negotiated through an earlier agreement between government and labor, called the 
National Framework Agreement (NFA). 
 
  The GEAR document contained ambitious targets for the South African economy – by 
the year 2000 the economy was to generate a sustainable 6 percent average growth rate and 
400,000 new jobs each year. A critical link in the logic of the GEAR strategy was a rapid expansion of new investment – in particular, foreign direct investment. High levels of new 
investment would support rapid rates of economic growth which, in turn, would create hundreds 
of thousands of jobs. The twin engines of high growth and rapid job creation would allow South 
Africa to overcome the vast inequalities that apartheid left behind. Growth would allow for the 
eventual expansion of social services and the provision of infrastructure, job creation would raise 
the incomes of ordinary South Africans. 
 
 
The Post-Apartheid Economy: growth, inflation, and investment 
 
        Has the South African economy been able to deliver in the post-apartheid era? Table 1 
shows the record on gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and its component expenditure 
categories, for two time periods – 1996-2002, corresponding to the introduction of the GEAR 
policies, and 1994-2002, corresponding to the entire democratic era. Between 1996 and 2002, 
economic growth never came close to the GEAR forecasts. Even if we restrict our attention to 
GDP in the final years of the period, 2000-2002, the economy grew at an average annualized rate 
of approximately 3 percent – about half of the target level. The most important contributors to 
economic growth were an expansion of consumer spending and increased exports. Investment – 
the linchpin of the GEAR strategy – increased at a lower rate than overall economic growth. 
 
Table 1. 


















Exports  2.8% 4.5% 
Less: Imports  1.5% 4.2% 
Source: South African Reserve Bank. Note: Estimates for 2002  
were calculated by extrapolating the average real growth rates  
of the first three quarters. For example, GDP growth for 2002  
was estimated to be 2.9%. 
 
  Comparing the growth record under the GEAR policies with that of the entire post-
apartheid era reveals some interesting patterns. The overall annualized growth rates do not differ 
dramatically – 2.6 percent versus 2.8 percent. However, the expenditure components of GDP 
show more significant shifts. Spending on imports dropped off significantly in the years of the 
GEAR policy compared to the full time period. This could be good news, since slower growth of 
imports could raise demand for domestic goods and improve South Africa’s trade balance with 
the rest of the world. Unfortunately, the drop in the rate of expansion of imports coincided with a 
drop in the growth rate of all other expenditure categories, with the notable exception of 
government spending. The slower growth of government expenditures in the years immediately following the ’94 elections do not reflect a policy of fiscal constraint as much as they reflect high 
levels of spending and the rapid build-up of public debt during the final years of the apartheid 
regime. 
 
Table 2. Economic and social indicators, South Africa, 1994-2002 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Economic  growth  3.2% 3.1% 4.3% 2.6% 0.8% 2.0% 3.5% 2.8% 2.9% 
Inflation rate  8.8%  8.7%  7.3%  8.6%  6.9%  5.2%  5.4%  5.7%  8.8% 
Real prime lending 
rate  6.8%  9.2%  12.2%  11.4%  14.9%  12.8%  9.1%  8.1%  6.0% 
Exchange rate 
(R/$US), year end  R3.54  R3.65  R4.68  R4.87  R5.86  R6.15  R7.57  R12.13  R8.51 
Budget  deficit/GDP 5.1% 4.5% 4.6% 3.8% 2.3% 2.0% 2.0% 1.4% 2.1% 
Rate of accumulation 
of fixed capital  0.8% 1.3% 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9%  n/a 
% pregnant women 
with HIV/AIDS, 
median urban 
6.0  9.0  13.5  14.9  19.2  21.0  24.3  n/a  n/a 
% pregnant women 
with HIV/AIDS, 
median non-urban 
6.7  8.3  16.3  18.1  21.3  23.0  22.9  n/a  n/a 
Growth rate: private 
sector employment  -0.9% 0.5% -2.6% -2.5% -4.4% -1.3% -2.0% -1.4%  n/a 
Growth rate: total 
formal sector 
employment 
-0.4% -1.1% -0.7% -1.7% -3.5% -2.0% -2.7% -1.6%  n/a 
National income per 
capita (R1995) 
R13 586  R13 656  R13 961  R13 987  R13 759  R13 641  R13 789  R13 862  n/a 
Sources: South African Reserve Bank; International Monetary Fund, International Finance Statistics, CD-ROM; 
South African Department of Finance, Budget Review 2002; UNAIDS “Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS 
and Sexually Transmitted Diseases: South Africa”, 2002 Update. Note: The growth rate for 2002 is based on the 
trend over the first three quarter; the inflation rate on the first 10 months; and the prime lending rate on the first 6 
months. 
 
   The growth rate of the economy only tells us so much about the performance of the post-
1994 South African economy. Table 2 provides a more detailed year-by-year socio-economic 
picture, illustrated by a number of key indicators. A central element of the GEAR policy is to 
keep inflation low while liberalizing financial markets. In general, inflation has come down over 
this period. However, the price paid for low inflation has been relatively higher real interest 
rates, which likely dragged down economic growth. Furthermore, an on-going erosion in the 
value of the rand contributed to the trade-off between interest rates and inflation. The rand never 
stabilized during this entire period. In particular, a dramatic fall in the rand during 2001/02 led to 
a re-emergence of inflationary pressures – including rapid increases in the prices of basic food 
items.  
 
  The National Treasury has managed to reduce the size of South Africa’s budget deficit – 
outperforming the targets outlined in the original GEAR policy. However, low inflation and 
declining deficits have not revitalized private investment. The growth rate of fixed capital stock 
(that is, the rate of accumulation) has remained at historically low levels. Moreover, the success 
in meeting the deficit reduction targets should be seen in a broader context: specifically, the 
tragedy of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The average prevalence rate of the disease among pregnant women has grown to between 22 and 25 percent in South Africa, raising serious 
questions as to whether expanding efforts to stop the disease and treat the dying should receive 
much more priority, even if it compromises future deficit reduction targets. 
 
 
The South African employment crisis: jobless growth 
 
  If growth and investment have yet to measure up, how has the second element of the 
macroeconomic strategy – employment – fared during this period? Here the record is alarming. 
As Table 2 shows, jobs have been lost throughout this period, pushing South Africa’s already 
high unemployment rate higher still. Although growth rates have fallen below the optimistic 
projections of the GEAR strategy, economic growth was generally positive throughout the post-
apartheid period. However, growth in employment has been consistently negative. Such “jobless 
growth” raises serious concerns that current economic policies have failed to translate even 
modest levels of growth into real social benefits. 
 
  In addition, a comparison of changes in private employment and total employment reveal 
some significant patterns. Before 2000, the rate of decline in private employment was almost 
always larger than the decline in total employment. This suggests that public employment helped 
to soften the blow of job losses in the private sector. However, beginning in 2000, total 
employment actually declined faster than private employment, suggesting that government 
employment policies are contributing to the unemployment crisis instead of moderating it. An 
increasing rate of unemployment has serious social consequences that extend beyond the loss of 
income of the newly jobless. Because of these social costs to unemployment, there is a clear role 





  Average incomes in South Africa have not grown significantly during the democratic era. 
For example, real national income per capita was at approximately the same level in 2001 as it 
was in 1994 (Table 2). However, averages tell us little about how the current economic policies 
are coping with one of the largest challenges left behind by the apartheid system: the vast 
economic inequalities that exist in South Africa. To get a better sense of the final component of 
the GEAR strategy – redistribution – it is important to look at changes in the distribution of 
income. 
 
Table 3 presents data on the distribution of income in South Africa based on recent (1995 
and 2000) Income and Expenditure surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa. The extent of 
inequality in South Africa is dramatic: in 2000, the poorest 20 percent of households in South 
Africa received just 1.63 percent of all income, while the richest 20 percent of households 
received 35 percent of total income. Moreover, the extent of inequality has been increasing. In 
1995, the poorest 20 percent of households received a larger share of total income – 1.87 percent. 
This increase in inequality is also reflected in South Africa’s Gini coefficient – a measure of 
inequality ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). The Gini coefficient for 
South Africa rose from 0.56 in 1995 to 0.57 in 2000. This change is relatively small, but it clearly reveals that South Africa is not moving in the direction of mitigating the inequalities left 
behind by the apartheid regime. 
 
Table 3. Income inequality. 
  2000 1995  %  change 
Income share of bottom 
20% of households  1.63% 1.87% -12.8% 
Income share of top 20% of 
households  35.13% 35.05%  +0.2% 
Gini coefficient  0.57 0.56  +1.8% 
Income of African 
households (2000 Rand)  R26 000  R32 000  -18.8% 
Income of White households 
(2000 Rand)  R158 000  R137 000  +15.3% 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2002), Earning and Spending in South Africa: selected 
 findings and comparisons from the Income and Expenditure surveys of October 1995  
and October 2000, Pretoria. 
 
 
  Finally, given the importance of race in South Africa’s history, it can be revealing to 
examine changes in incomes within the historical racial classifications of the apartheid 
government. Average incomes of African households, expressed as year 2000 rands, actually fell 
by over 18 percent from 1995 to 2000. Many factors contributed to this decline – from growing 
unemployment to the ravages of HIV/AIDS.  In contrast, average real incomes of White 
households actually increased by over 15 percent during this same period. In terms of these 
figures, there is little evidence that the economic strategies implemented after the 1994 elections 




A way forward? 
 
  The market-friendly, liberalization policies pursued in recent years have not delivered the 
social benefits needed to transform the South African economy and eventually free it from the 
historical chains of apartheid. To be fair, there have been a number of successes that can be 
attributed to the economic management of the democratic era thus far. The economy has 
achieved modest levels of growth and has avoided any serious economic downturn during a 
period in which other countries around the world faced extremely serious economic crises. In 
addition, there have been some significant gains in access to basic services and infrastructure – 
piped water, community taps, electrical service, and housing. Nevertheless, in terms of the three 
components of the government’s macroeconomic strategy – growth, employment, and 
redistribution – only growth shows any evidence of positive performance and even this falls well 
below the expectations of what the South African economy is truly capable of. 
 
  In order to realize the real potential for growth, employment, and redistribution, 
economic policies should move away from market-friendly, inflation-targeting strategies and 
towards a developmental, employment-targeting approach. The exact content of such a strategy is well beyond the scope of this short brief, but it would certainly involve direct controls on 
capital mobility, monetary policies conducive to job creating investment, sustainable public 
investment and employment, income transfers to address the most severe forms of poverty, free 
public treatment for HIV/AIDS, and efficient regulation rather than outright liberalization. 
Although a detailed plan for implementing these specific policy proposals would require 
additional research, such policies reflect viable alternatives for an economy like South Africa’s 
in this era of global integration. 
 
 
 